

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

In the Matter of AARON ANDREW WATKINS,
Minor.

FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

TAMEKO WATKINS,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

GEORGE DAVENPORT,

Respondent.

UNPUBLISHED
September 14, 2004

No. 251899
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 90-286439

Before: Donofrio, P.J., and White and Talbot, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i), and (j). We affirm.

The trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence to establish statutory grounds for termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights. MCR 3.977(J); *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

Initially, we note that respondent-appellant has failed to challenge the termination of her parental rights under subsection (i). Failure to brief an issue generally results in abandonment or waiver of the issue on appeal. *Singerman v Municipal Service Bureau, Inc*, 211 Mich App 678, 684; 536 NW2d 547 (1995). Further, sufficient evidence existed to terminate respondent-appellant's parental rights under subsection (i). The statutory prerequisites for subsection (i), that the prior termination be for serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and that prior attempts at rehabilitation failed, were met in this case. Respondent-appellant abused alcohol while pregnant with Nicole, during the pendency of the case, and made little

improvement although allowed almost two years to comply with the Parent-Agency Agreement (PAA).

Nor did the trial court err in finding clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent-appellant's parental rights under subsections (c)(i), (g), and (j). Aaron entered foster care at the age of six months after respondent-appellant was found intoxicated and creating a disturbance at a shelter. While respondent-appellant did attempt, with some success, several treatments for her alcohol and mental health problems, she continued to drink, thereby exacerbating her other health problems, and failed to substantially comply with other important elements of her PAA regarding her mental health. The court did not clearly err in concluding that there was no reasonable expectation that respondent-appellant would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time.

Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant's parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); *Trejo, supra* at 356-357. Respondent-appellant's serious alcohol problem proved resistant to change in the past, and it would not be in Aaron's best interests to wait for amelioration of a problem that respondent-appellant had failed repeatedly to conquer. Moreover, Aaron was very young when removed from respondent-appellant's care, and the evidence did not show the existence of a significant parent-child bond. We find no clear error in the trial court's determination on the best interests issue.

Affirmed.

/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot